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Using firm level data from Africa and Asia, we estimate the impact of being in a special
economic zone (SEZ) on a firm’s probability of exporting, export intensity, and value of
exports. At the extensive margin, we find that SEZ firms in open economies are 25% more
likely to export than their non-SEZ counterparts, with a large negative effect in closed
economies. At the intensive margin, we find that SEZs increase the value of exports, but
only in countries with barriers to imports where the estimate increase is 3.6%. Thus, the
estimated effect of introducing an SEZ can be meaningful, but is heavily contingent on the
local economic environment.
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1 Introduction
With the link between exports and economic growth well established, numerous government
policies have sought to encourage exports as a method of increasing productivity and growth.
One such policy that has been widely utilized is the special economic zone (SEZ).1 According
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1 In the literature, several types of SEZs are discussed, including freeports, free trade zones, export
promotion zones and industrial parks. Nevertheless, there is no clear-cut distinction between these
with the definitions depending on the study at hand (see Akinci and Farole (2011) for discussion).
Since our data do not distinguish among types of SEZs, we combine all of these under this single
heading.
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to the World Bank (2008), as of 2008 there were over 3500 SEZs which amounted to 68 million
jobs and over $500 billion in trade-related value added. As of 2015, the number of SEZs stood
at more than 4000 (The Economist, 2015; Nazarczuk, 2017). As described in Farole (2011),
an SEZ is a defined geographic area in which special incentives and/or policies apply that are
not available elsewhere in the country. Zeng (2015) notes that common SEZ features include
streamlined processing of goods ready for export, lower export fees, and reductions in taxes
and import tariffs on intermediates, all of which aim to make SEZ firms more competitive on
world markets. As such, they are intended to be areas that encourage development via increased
exporting, innovation, and investment. That said, setting up a production in an SEZ involves
high fixed costs followed by uncertainty over the stability of the benefits SEZ residents will
receive.2 Furthermore, the usefulness of SEZ production is obviously contingent on the eco-
nomic conditions a firm operates in and therefore changes in investment climate, institutional
quality, or trade policy in the SEZ-granting country or overseas can impact their usefulness to
firms (Aggarwal, 2012). As such, even if the polices announced in an SEZ are attractive on the
surface, this may not be enough to induce changes to firm behavior.
Although there is a large body of case studies that provide often contradictory findings about
the impact of SEZs on firm choices, there is little rigorous evidence on their economic impacts,
particularly with respect to their main goal of promoting exporting.3 With this in mind, this
paper uses data on 11,161 firms across 21 Asian and African countries to test whether SEZs
affect exports at either the extensive margin (i.e. whether to export at all) and/or the intensive
margin (that is, how much to export conditional on exporting at all).4
Specifically, we use an exporter dummy variable for our extensive margin analysis and both
the logged share of exports in total sales the logged value of total exports as measure of the
intensive margin.5 We find that the estimated impact is conditional on the local economic
environment. In open economies, SEZs increase the probability of exporting by 25% but have
no marked effect on the intensive margin of trade. In closed economies, SEZs appear to lower
the probability of exporting, potentially due to increased scrutiny by trade officials. That said,
they do appear to increase the value of trade by as much as 42%. Thus, in order to anticipate
the potential effects of an SEZ, it is necessary to consider them in context of the local economic
2 See Yang, et al. (2011) for a discussion of the costs of operating in an SEZ. Nazarczuk (2015) and
Madani (1999) describe the uncertainty over the stability and longevity of SEZ provisions.
3 See Zeng (2015), Farole and Akinci (2011), and Farole (2011) for examples and surveys of the litera-
ture.
4 In particular, Zeng (2015) notes the lack of analysis of African SEZs. Aggarwal (2005) provides a
review the main EPZs (Export Processing Zones) of India, finding that exports from EPZs have grown
dramatically and now account for 50% of Indian manufacturing exports and 80% of their exports of
electrical products. Note that Indian firms make up roughly half of our data.
5 Intensive margin changes would result from SEZ effects on marginal costs (such as export duties or
VAT rates) whereas changes at the extensive margin would also include changes in the fixed cost of
exporting (such as red tape costs).
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environment.
Alongside the rise of SEZs, an economic literature has grown to examine the link between
SEZs, trade, and economic growth. On the theory side of this discussion, the focus has been
on describing when and how to best use SEZs to improve exports and growth.6 On the empir-
ical side, the large majority of the literature is descriptive, discussing the experience of areas
with SEZs via aggregated data. Examples here include Bra¨utigam and Tang (2014), Aggarwal
(2005), Ge (1999), Amirahmadi and Wu (1995), and the contributions collected by Farole and
Akinci (2011) and Farole (2011). On the whole, the indications from this literature are best
described as mixed, with some suggesting that SEZs have sizable impacts on trade, investment,
and welfare while others find the opposite. In any case, this literature does not employ re-
gression analysis, instead relying on summary statistics for evaluating the impact of SEZs on
exports.
There are, however, exceptions to this rule.7 Leong (2013), in a regression estimating the
impact of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) on growth in Chinese and Indian regions,
uses SEZs as an instrument for these endogenous variables.8 However, he does not report the
first stage results, and thus the impact of SEZs on exports, from his estimation. Also using
Chinese regional data, Wang (2013) estimates the impact of factors such as FDI and exports
on regional capital investment and productivity growth, finding that after the introduction of an
SEZ, both variables have larger effects than before the SEZ was instituted. Likewise, Jensen and
Winiarczyk (2014) consider the impact of SEZs on the development of Polish regions. They
find that although SEZs there have attracted FDI, they have contributed little to employment
or wage improvements. Closer to our level of analysis, Ebenstein (2012) utilizes firm-level
information for China to examine the impact of SEZs on firm employment, productivity, and
wages, finding positive effects on the first two. However, despite the stated SEZ goal of export
promotion, none of these studies estimate the effect of SEZs on exports themselves.9 10
To our knowledge, only a handful of studies specifically examine SEZs and exports using
6 Examples include Klein (2010), Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi (2010), Schweinberger (2003), Yabuuchi
(2000), Devereux and Chen (1995), Din (1994), Miyagawa (1992, 1986), and Hamilton and Svennson
(1982).
7 Beyond the studies discussed here specifically related to SEZs, Busso, Gregory, and Klien (2013)
estimate the effect of empowerment zones in the US (a place specific policy comparable to a SEZ
without the SEZ’s international focus) on local employment and wage growth.
8 When not using an instrumental variables estimator but including SEZs as a control variable, Leong
(2013) found that SEZs had no clear-cut effect on growth, with the coefficient ranging from significantly
positive to insignificant or even significantly negative depending on the controls and sample used.
9 Although not a regression based analysis, Defever and Rian˜o (2015) calibrate Chinese data to a model
with SEZs, inferring that SEZs have a sizable impact on exports.
10 Yang, et al. (2011) focus on Cross-Border SEZs (CB-SEZs) around Chinese border which promotes
cross-border trade with neighbors. However, they do not analyze exporting but rather various measures
of firm performance.
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regression analysis. Johansson and Nilsson (1997) estimate the impact of SEZs on aggregate ex-
ports for eleven developing countries over 13 years. While they tend to find a positive effect, the
country-specific results indicate a great deal of heterogeneity, leading them to conclude that the
export promotion effects are potentially positive only for generally export-oriented economies
something which, due to the exclusion of fixed effects, they cannot control for. In contrast, by
using firm-level data we can do precisely that. In particular, by doing so, we are able to illus-
trate that the conditionality hinted at by Johansson and Nilsson (1997) is a driving factor in the
effect of SEZs. Most similar to our analysis are the various single country, firm-level studies
that examine SEZ influence on exporting at the extensive and intensive margins. Examples here
include Nazarczuk and Uminski (2018) (Poland) and Defever, et al. (2017) (Dominican Re-
public). One issue issue for these studies is that they do not address the potential endogeneity
of SEZs (i.e. that they may be established in areas where FDI or productive firms are already
present). As found in the single country studies of Steenbergen and Javorcik (2017) (Rwanda)
and Nazarczuk and Uminski (2018) (Poland) matching across firms is the standard method of
doing so, a practice we also use.11 Our results complement all of these by using cross-country
data as opposed to that for a single country. In particular, it is worth noting that some find
positive effects on exporting (e.g. Nazarczuk and Uminski (2018)) whereas others find no effect
(including Steenbergen and Javorcik (2017)). One possible reason for this is that, as suggested
by Johansson and Nilsson (1997), underlying country heterogeneity may have an important ef-
fect. By using cross-country data, we are able to examine how the SEZ effect depends on trade
policy, offering a potential rationale for the different effects in the literature.
Using our firm-level data covering 21 African and Asian countries, we begin by comparing
firms in SEZs to non-SEZ firms. We find that SEZ firms are generally more export oriented
at the extensive and intensive margins, being both more likely to export and exporting greater
values, although the share of revenue generated from exports is somewhat smaller. This mirrors
the data of Johansson and Nilsson (1997). However, we also find that, among other differences,
SEZ firms are more productive, larger, and more likely to be foreign-owned, all things found
in the literature to be positively associated with exporting. Nazarczuk (2017) finds the same
pattern in Polish data by looking at Kernel densities of firm characteristics of SEZ and non-SEZ
firms. Turning to regression analysis where we can control for fixed country, sector, and year
effects, we find that it indeed these other firm-specific factors that explain the greater export
activity of SEZ firms. This result, however, is an average effect. We proceed by allowing
11 Note that Steenbergen and Javorcik (2017) performs the propensity score matching with difference-in-
difference option and find that if a firm chooses to move to a SEZ that fact doubles its output and its
imports but no real impact of exporting. Nazarczuk (2017) uses a matching estimator on Polish firms
but exporting status is a control, not a dependent variable in the analysis of firm productivity. It is also
worth noting the contribution of Wang (2013) who uses a matching estimator across Chinese regions
rather than firms. Alder, et al. (2013) do not use matching, but follow Wang (2013) by using Chinese
cities.
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the impact of the SEZ to vary with local country-level characteristics which are intended to
reflect the types of barriers SEZs supposedly mitigate, namely export costs, taxes, regulatory
burdens, weak institutions, and barriers to imports. Here, we find two results. First, when
exporting and/or importing is relatively easy, firms in SEZs do indeed seem more likely to
export. In contrast, when a country is closed, we find a negative impact of SEZs on the extensive
margin. This may be due to closed countries’ trade authorities heavily monitoring activities
with SEZs, reflective of the possibilities raised by Johansson and Nilsson (1997). Both of these
effects are large; the first suggests a 25% increase in the probability of exporting whereas the
second implies a nearly 100% decrease. Second, for firms that do export, SEZs lead to higher
export values when importing is difficult, with export sales rising approximately 42%. This
is consistent with the notion that SEZs often permit importing at lower cost. Thus, although
throughout our analysis we find no significant effect at the mean, we do find important effects
depending on the country’s openness to trade. Although our data do not allow us to distinguish
whether these differences are due to cross-country differences in the SEZs themselves or arise
from their interactions with other policies that vary across countries, it does point to a strong
conditionality of their effects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview of
our data, including a discussion of its overarching features. Section 4 describes our econometric
approach and provides our results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Summary Statistics
2.1 Data Sources and Construction
Our firm-level data come from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys.12 Note that our data come
from the more recent, unstandardized surveys as only these included a question on whether or
not a firm was in an SEZ.13 This also limits the country coverage relative to the standardized
surveys, leaving us with 21 African and South Asian countries, with their surveys being carried
out between 2007 and 2014. The data are cross-sectional, with surveys taking place once in
each country.14 Although the data include observations on services and retail/wholesale firms,
as these firms do not face the same types of export barriers manufacturers do, we restrict the
data to manufacturing.15 After cleaning and harmonizing across the countries, the surveys have
a similar layout and were conducted using a common methodology of random stratified sam-
12 These can be found at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/
13 To our knowledge, ours is the first analysis of these more recent data.
14 A handful of countries have been surveyed twice, however, as we cannot tell which firms were surveyed
more than once, we cannot use this aspect of the data and therefore only use the largest survey round
for each country. Similar approach has been used by Davies and Jeppesen (2015).
15 Specifically, we use firms in industries 15 to 37 using the ISIC 3.1 Rev. Classification.
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pling.16 In all surveys, the World Bank defines the survey universe as “commercial, service or
industrial business establishments with at least five fulltime-employees”. The list of countries
in our sample, the year of their survey, the number of observations, and the number of observa-
tions within an SEZ is provided in Table 1. In total, the sample contains 11,161 firms, 58% of
which are in SEZs.17
Table 1: Countries in the Sample
Country Num. of Firms Num. of SEZ Firms Year
Angola 111 22 2010
Bangladesh 1138 172 2013
Botswana 88 49 2010
Burkina Faso 61 28 2009
Cameroon 65 18 2009
Chad 57 16 2009
Ethiopia 177 61 2011
India 6834 4523 2014
Lesotho 43 27 2009
Madagascar 116 30 2009
Mali 283 283 2007
Mauritius 126 29 2009
Mozambique 253 253 2007
Nepal 243 162 2013
Nigeria 45 15 2009
South Africa 506 506 2007
Sri Lanka 310 12 2011
Tanzania 229 2013
Togo 13 2009
Uganda 233 2013
Zambia 243 243 2007
Total 11161 6449
16 Specifically, it uses strata on firm size (with three categories: <20 employees, 20-99 employees, and
100+ employees).
17 This sample is the one for which all of our country-level controls were available. In unreported results,
depending on the country level controls included, we were able to increase the number of firms to
12,279 over 31 countries. This, however, did not affect the nature of the estimates. These are available
on request.
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During the preparation of the unstandardized surveys we extracted several firm-specific vari-
ables. In particular, we have three measures of firm exporting behaviour: a exporter dummy
variable indicating whether or not the firm exports, the log of the share of sales generated by
exporting (referred to as export intensity), and the log of the value of exports. These variables
are standard ones used by the literature to describe a firm’s exporting behaviour at the exten-
sive and intensive margins.18 In addition, we collected several control variables identified by
the literature as correlated with exporting. First, we include labour productivity, measured as
the log of sales relative to employment.19 Note that, although this measure does not control
for other inputs, and is therefore not productivity itself, it is commonly employed as such in
the literature (see Pavnick, 2002). Second, as a measure of firm size, we use the logged value
of employment. In addition, we use the log of the firm’s age. Third, we include five dummy
variables respectively indicating whether or not a firm is foreign-owned, has an internationally
recognized quality certificate, is a multi-product firm, licenses foreign technology, or imports
intermediate inputs. Previous work using the standardized surveys finds that all of these are
positively correlated both with the probability of exporting and the volume of exports, thus our
priors are that the same holds true in our data.20 Finally, and most importantly for our purposes,
we have information on whether or not the firm self-identifies as being located in an SEZ.21 If,
as is generally believed, firms in SEZs find exporting both easier (due to lowered export barri-
ers) and more profitable (due to lower taxes and barriers to imported intermediates), we expect
that firms in SEZs would be more likely to export, have greater export sales, and have a higher
export intensity.22
To explore this notion further, we introduce five country-level variables which represent
measures of the types of barriers SEZs supposedly overcome. First, we create a measure of
policy-driven exporting costs, using the Trading Across Border data from the World Bank Doing
Business database (World Bank 2014).23 More specifically, we combine three variables, the
18 Further, these have the best cross-country coverage in the surveys.
19 All monetary values are reported in local currencies, which we deflate using the annual consumer price
index from the World Bank Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006-2014) and thereafter convert
to US dollars using the annual average exchange rate from the same source.
20 Examples include Davies and Jeppesen (2015) and Davies and Mazhikeyev (2015).
21 The earlier surveys in our data only ask whether or not a firm is in an SEZ; some later ones further break
this down into whether the firm is located in an export processing zone or an industrial park. We do not
make use of this distinction here for two reasons. First, the World Bank do not provide any information
in the surveys or the implementation notes detailing the difference between the two, thus, it is not clear
whether or not this distinction is comparable across surveys. Furthermore, the existing literature is
itself at odds over the difference (if any) between the two (see Madani (1999) for discussion). Second,
using this information severely limits the sample size.
22 For a discussion of the tax exemptions in African SEZs, see Bra¨utigam and Tang (2014).
23 Note that as we do not have data on the export destination, we cannot control for destination-varying
trade costs, only for origin export costs.
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number of documents needed to export, the average number of days before a container is cleared
for export, and the average cost of containerized export. We use these three measures precisely
because the reflect the types of export barriers SEZs are intended to reduce. Across all three,
there is a relatively high cross-country variation. The cost of exporting ranges from $560 in Sri
Lanka to $6615 in Chad, while the number of documents required range from 4 in Mauritius to
11 in Cameroon, the Congo, and Nepal. Mauritius is also the country where it takes the least
time to clear cargo for exporting, with an average of 10 days. At the other end of the distribution
is Afghanistan, with an average of 86 days. That said, within a country, all three measures
are relatively highly correlated. Because of this, we follow Davies and Jeppesen (2015) use
principal component analysis to construct a source-specific export cost index. Details from this
construction are found in Table 2. If SEZs help firms by lowering export barriers, we expect a
positive coefficient from an interaction between the firm’s SEZ variable and the country’s export
cost variable since it is in those countries with the greatest barriers that SEZs might provide the
greatest benefits.
Second, we use a cross-country index that identifies the extent to which local business own-
ers find the level of taxes to be a barrier to work and investment. This was rescaled so that
higher numbers indicate more burdensome taxes.24 Third, we include an index on the local
perception of the quality of government institutions, with higher numbers meaning lower insti-
tutional quality. Both of these were obtained from the World Economic Forum (2014). From
the Fraser Institute (2014), we obtained two additional indices: one measuring the burden of
government regulation and one indicating the extent to which non-tariff barriers (NTBs) reduce
the ability of imported goods to compete in local markets. Both of these were scaled so that
higher numbers indicated greater restrictions. As with the export cost variable, we expect the
interactions between firm i’s SEZ dummy and the local index to be positive, i.e. SEZ do more to
promote exports when local barriers are large. Summary statistics for all variables are in Table
3.
2.2 SEZ vs. Non-SEZ firms
Before proceeding to regression analysis, it is useful to make some simple comparisons between
SEZ and non-SEZ firms. Table 4 presents the means of our firm-level variables for SEZ and
non-SEZ firms. The third column presents the coefficient from the SEZ dummy when regressing
the variable in question on the SEZ dummy and a set of industry, country, and year dummies.
Beginning with the exporter dummy variable, 20.8% of SEZ firms export, whereas 20.1% of
non-SEZ firms do. After controlling for country, industry, and year effects in what amounts to
a linear probability model, we find that SEZ firms are roughly 0.7% more likely to export with
24 Specifically, in all the indices described here, we use the closest year available to the year of a given
country’s survey and when needed rescaled the variable so that higher numbers mean greater burdens.
See the relevant source for discussion on the construction of the particular index.
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Table 2: Construction of Export Costs
Panel A: 1 2
Number of obs. 11161
Retained factors 1
No. parameters 3
Panel B: Eigenvalue Proportion
Factor1 1.9578 0.6526
Factor2 0.8639 0.288
Factor3 0.1781 0.0594
Panel C:
Variables Factor1 Loadings Uniqueness
Documents to export 0.5221 0.7274
Time to export 0.9416 0.1134
Cost to export 0.8937 0.2013
this difference highly significant. Likewise, SEZ firms export a greater value, where the result
in column 3 indicates that SEZ firms export values are 37% higher than comparable firms.25
The mean of the export intensity, however, is 35.4% lower for SEZ firms. Thus, these results
suggest that SEZs may well increase exporting, if not the export intensity. However, it must
be remembered that other factors also influence export activity and, as the rest of the table
indicates, these differences are also significant.
In particular, SEZ firms are markedly more productive and larger, two variables that are
typically positively correlated with exporting.26 On a top of that, we find that SEZ firms are
11.2% younger than their non-SEZ counterparts which would generally makes them less export-
oriented. Beyond these differences, we find that SEZ firms are slightly more likely to be foreign-
owned, import intermediates, and license a foreign technology. The are also 21.4% more likely
to have a quality certification. Finally, we find that they are slightly less likely to be multi-
product firms. Thus, just as we find SEZ firms are more export oriented, we find that many of
their characteristics also predispose them to exporting. In order to simultaneously control for
all of these differences, we now turn to our regression analysis.
25 Recall that when interpreting a coefficient β on a dummy variable in a log-linear equation, the percent-
age impact of going from 0 to 1 is 100 ∗ (eβ − 1).
26 Using data on Polish firms, Nazarczuk (2017) also finds that SEZ firms are more productive than non-
SEZ firms on average and that SEZ firms have greater value added per employee.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Exporter 11161 0.205 0.404 0.000 1.000
Export Share 2291 -1.126 1.162 -5.298 0.000
Sales 2291 13.848 2.423 4.541 23.250
Productivity 11161 9.868 1.735 1.902 20.280
Employment 11161 3.699 1.335 0.000 11.074
Age 11161 2.680 0.803 0.000 5.242
Foreign Owned 11161 0.052 0.222 0.000 1.000
Quality Cert. 11161 0.377 0.485 0.000 1.000
Multi-product 11161 0.380 0.485 0.000 1.000
Import 11161 0.146 0.354 0.000 1.000
License 11161 0.130 0.336 0.000 1.000
Export Cost 11161 0.000 1.000 -1.883 5.958
Taxes 11161 -3.943 0.605 -4.800 0.000
Regulations 11161 -5.603 0.561 -6.598 -3.136
Institutions 11161 5.317 0.911 0.000 5.900
NTBs 11161 -5.991 0.637 -6.913 -3.529
3 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy makes use of both regression analysis and propensity score matching.
In Section 2, we found significant differences in the exporting behavior of SEZ and non-SEZ
firms. However, before attributing the differences to being in an SEZ, it must be remembered
that there were other significant differences as well which are often found to be correlated with
exporting choices. Therefore, we turn to regression analysis that begins with a baseline spec-
ification (as specified below) to examine the relationship between SEZ status and exporting at
the extensive and intensive margins while controlling for other factors. Following this, because
the presumption is that SEZs impact exporting via lower trade barriers, we extend our regres-
sion specification by taking into account a number of important obstacles firms face, namely
export costs, non-tariff barriers, taxes, institutional quality, and regulatory burden. We do so
to investigate the potential conditionality suggested by Johansson and Nilsson (1997). Finally,
we address the concern over the potential endogeneity in the SEZ variable, i.e. firms located
in SEZs are there precisely because they intend to export (or the opposite). Ebenstein (2012),
for instance, finds that in China, foreign-owned firms (many of which export) are indeed more
likely to open in SEZs than elsewhere (with no impact on the location of domestic firms). Fol-
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Table 4: SEZ Versus non-SEZ Firms
Variable SEZ non-SEZ Difference % Change
Exporter 0.208 0.201 0.007*** 0.7%
Export Share -1.307 -0.869 -0.437*** -35.4%
Export Sales 13.979 13.663 0.315*** 37.0%
Productivity 10.210 9.401 0.809*** 124.6%
Employment 3.779 3.589 0.190*** 20.9%
Age 2.633 2.744 -0.112*** -10.6%
Foreign Owned 0.058 0.044 0.014*** 1.4%
Quality Cert. 0.467 0.253 0.213*** 23.7%
Multi-product 0.352 0.418 -0.066** -6.4%
Import 0.146 0.147 0.000*** 0.0%
License 0.149 0.104 0.044*** 4.5%
Obs. 6449 4712
Notes: SEZ coefficient comes from a regression using SEZ,country, sec-
tor, and year dummies. ***, **, and * on difference denote significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Percent change is 100(eβ −1)
where β is the SEZ coefficient. The export intensity and export value
results only use exporting firms.
lowing, e.g. Nazarczuk and Uminski (2018), we therefore apply a propensity score matching
methodology.
3.1 The Regression Model
In our baseline specification, we estimate for firm i in country j in sector s surveyed in year t:
EXPi = β0 + β1S EZi + β2Xi + θ j + θs + θt + εi (1)
where EXPi is one of three measures of firm i’s export behavior (i.e. the exporter dummy,
logged export intensity, or logged export value), S EZi is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is in
an SEZ, Xi is a vector of controls as discussed above, and the θs are a set of country, sector,
and year dummy variables. These latter then control for unobservables common across firms
in a given country (which are all observed for the same year), common across firms in a given
sector, and common to all firms surveyed in a particular year. Because the data come from a
stratified survey, we weight the observations according to the strata in the survey, specifically
employment in three categories (under 20, 20-99, and 100+) and country.27 Further, we cluster
27 See http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/methodology for discussion on the survey stratifica-
tion.
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the standard errors by country.
The firm level controls come from the same firm-level surveys. As noted above, we take
the log of continuous control variables (i.e. firms’ productivity level, the number of full-time
employees and age) before including them in regression/matching work. The other firm char-
acteristics such as ownership, quality certificates and importing status are binary dummy vari-
ables. The choice of this set of control variables is based on their common use in the literature
(e.g. Nazarczuk and Uminski (2018), Davies and Jeppesen (2015), McCann (2013), Nesterenko
(2003), and Pavnic (2002)) where those studies were in turn motivated by the heterogeneous
firms theory popularized by Melitz (2003) and Ottaviano and Melitz (2008). Overall, the litera-
ture suggests that the firms engage in export/import activities more if they are found to be more
productive, bigger in size, older, and have a certificate or license. As differences were found in
these between SEZ and non-SEZ firms (Table 4) it is therefore important to control for them in
our regression.
To this baseline specification, we introduce additional controls intended to proxy for the
differential impact of export costs, taxes, NTBs, regulation and institutional quality attributes
across SEZ and non-SEZ firms, where for country measure Y j we estimate:
EXPi = β0 + β1S EZi + α1S EZi ∗ Y j + β2Xi + θ j + θs + θt + εi. (2)
The standard presumption is that SEZs promote exporting as firms located in SEZs face
lower tariffs (or none in imported intermediates), lower non-tariff barriers to exporting, less
intrusive regulations, and/or pay lower taxes. Therefore we include these in our expanded
regression.28 Thus, these are the variables we turn to to examine the conditionality of SEZ
effects. To our best knowledge, there is no study which looks specifically at trade costs/barrier
variables and interacts them with SEZ variable.29 Note that with the inclusion of the additional
variables, the marginal effect of being in an SEZ is a function of β1 + α1 ∗ Y j. As our country
controls are negative at the mean in the data with a maximum value of zero (with the exception
of export costs which are mean zero by construction), if α1 is estimated to be negative, this
means that α1 ∗ Y j is positive, i.e. being in an SEZ increases exporting with an impact that
approaches zero as the barrier rises.
3.2 Propensity Score Matching
As an alternative estimation strategy, we employ propensity score matching approach. The
general idea behind this approach is to find a match for SEZ firms (treatment group) from non-
SEZ firms (control group) based on similarities in characteristics (productivity, employment
size, age, ownership etc.). This ensures that the firms in our compared groups are alike and by
28 Summary statistics for these are in Table 3.
29 Yang, et al. (2011) include controls such as financial services, tax incentives, and land price variables
in their export performance analysis, but do not condition the SEZ effect on them.
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that it reduces any selection bias which may be effecting the results from regression. With this
matching approach, the goal is to estimate the following:
τATT = ES EZ=1,p(X)(E(EXP(1)|S EZ=1,p(X)) − E(EXP(0)|S EZ=1,p(X))) (3)
which is the difference in the exporting variable E (here, the exporter dummy, export inten-
sity, or export value) when the firm is in an SEZ (i.e. is treated) versus when it is not, holding the
probability of the firm being in the SEZ constant (see Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).30 As any
remaining differences in the productivities of the matched sample of SEZ and non-SEZ firms is
attributed to the treatment, it is paramount to ensure that all observable factors influencing the
firm’s selection into a given treatment as well as the firm’s exporting behaviour, are controlled
for. Although several matching approaches are available, using a caliper of .0001 worked best
with respect to the tests of appropriateness (see Panel B of Table 6, discussed momentarily).
This, however, comes at the cost of the number of firms for which a match could be found, re-
sulting in only 4250 non-SEZ firms and 2645 SEZ firms for which there was common support
(i.e. slightly over half the sample). Nazarczuk and Uminski (2018) also use the same matching
approach like ours as a robustness check.31
4 The Results
4.1 Regression Analyses: The Extensive Margin of Trade
In Table 5 we present our estimates for the probability of exporting, i.e. on the extensive margin.
Here, we use a logit estimator due to the binary nature of the dependent variable.32 Column
1 presents the results using only the standard set of controls, all of which are positive and
significant as expected with the exceptions of the multi-product and license dummies which
are insignificant.33 Note that we are not claiming causation, but merely correlation due to the
lack of time series data needed for improved identification. In column 2, we introduce the SEZ
dummy variable. As can be seen, after controlling for the other differences across firms, we find
no significant impact of the SEZ variable. This is comparable to results Nazarczuk and Uminski
(2018) obtain from Polish data and Steenbergen and Javorcik’s (2017) estimates from Rwanda
data. Note that these two papers are also able to use time-series information, and therefore have
30 Note that we continue to control for country, sector, and year dummies in this.
31 In addition, they also employ the propensity score matching using a difference in difference method
which compares changes over time after a firm becomes located in an SEZ (see Guo and Fraser (2014),
Heckman, et al. (1997)). This was also done by Steenbergen and Javorcik (2017). This is not possible
in our case due to our reliance on cross-sectional data.
32 Note that as a firm either exports or does not, we do not suffer from violations of the Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption. Further, as we need to control for country, sector, and year
dummies, we cannot use a probit estimator.
33 Elliott and Virakul (2010) find a similar result for multi-product firms when using developing countries.
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more robust identification. Thus, the finding in Table 4 indicating a difference in the probability
of exporting seems to be the result of other differences across firms, not whether or not they are
in an SEZ.
Table 5: Probability of Exporting
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Productivity 0.185*** 0.184*** 0.188*** 0.184*** 0.185*** 0.184*** 0.187*** 0.191***
(0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0228) (0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0228)
Employment 0.601*** 0.601*** 0.604*** 0.601*** 0.601*** 0.601*** 0.602*** 0.603***
(0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0251) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0251)
Age 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.196*** 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.190*** 0.194*** 0.194***
(0.0396) (0.0399) (0.0401) (0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0400) (0.0402)
Foreign Owned 0.467*** 0.466*** 0.480*** 0.460*** 0.470*** 0.455*** 0.484*** 0.450***
(0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.137)
Quality Cert. 0.752*** 0.751*** 0.744*** 0.752*** 0.750*** 0.752*** 0.750*** 0.748***
(0.0690) (0.0694) (0.0695) (0.0695) (0.0694) (0.0694) (0.0696) (0.0695)
Multi-product 0.0392 0.0397 0.0454 0.0394 0.0397 0.0389 0.0410 0.0461
(0.0649) (0.0651) (0.0651) (0.0651) (0.0651) (0.0651) (0.0651) (0.0651)
License 0.0262 0.0254 0.0147 0.0265 0.0245 0.0271 0.0187 0.0125
(0.0809) (0.0812) (0.0814) (0.0812) (0.0812) (0.0813) (0.0813) (0.0817)
Import 1.139*** 1.139*** 1.150*** 1.137*** 1.140*** 1.134*** 1.148*** 1.144***
(0.0781) (0.0781) (0.0781) (0.0781) (0.0781) (0.0781) (0.0782) (0.0785)
SEZ 0.0115 -0.0155 0.516 -0.280 0.639 -1.979** 2.058
(0.0757) (0.0778) (0.621) (0.783) (0.538) (0.964) (1.575)
Export costs*SEZ -0.317*** -0.543***
(0.108) (0.160)
Taxes*SEZ 0.124 0.212
(0.151) (0.379)
Regulation*SEZ -0.0517 -0.102
(0.138) (0.384)
Institutions*SEZ 0.113 0.470**
(0.0958) (0.187)
NTBs*SEZ -0.326** -0.130
(0.156) (0.377)
Constant -8.320*** -8.321*** -8.223*** -8.460*** -8.298*** -8.493*** -8.404*** -9.196***
(0.509) (0.509) (0.524) (0.548) (0.513) (0.542) (0.507) (0.796)
Net SEZ effect=0 0.84 0.72 0.89 0.64 0.72 0.43
Observations 11,161 11,161 11,161 11,161 11,161 11,161 11,161 11,161
Notes: ***, **, and * on difference denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All specifications include
country, sector, and year dummies. Net SEZ Effect = 0 reports the p value at the sample mean.
One feature of this result, however, is that it assumes that the impact of SEZs is the same
everywhere. As discussed in the introduction, SEZs are often intended to aid firms in overcom-
ing trade barriers. Thus, it may be that the positive effect of an SEZ is found in a country where
exporting is expensive. With this in mind, column 3 introduces an interaction between the SEZ
dummy and the export cost variable (recall that since the export cost is a country-level variable
and each country is surveyed in a single year, the country dummy absorbs the non-interacted
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export cost variable).34 If SEZs aid in overcoming export costs and therefore play a role mostly
in high export cost countries, we expect this coefficient to be positive. In contrast, we find that
it is significantly negative, i.e. in a high export cost country an SEZ firm is less likely to export.
This may reflect the findings of Johansson and Nilsson (1997), where they argue that SEZs
encourage exports in primarily export-oriented (i.e. low export cost) countries. As reported at
the bottom of the table, at the sample mean for export costs, the estimated marginal effect is
insignificant.
This should not, however, be interpreted as no significant effect since at the sample mean
export costs are zero (by construction). Instead, this should be interpreted as in Figure 1 which
plots the difference in the estimated probability of exporting for an SEZ firm relative to a non-
SEZ firm (vertical axis), all else equal, across the spectrum of export cost values (horizontal
axis). The figure indicates that if in a country export costs are low (i.e. the left upper corner)
SEZ firms are more likely to export with the reverse found when exporting is expensive (i.e.
right bottom corner). At the minimum of the export cost measure, the estimated marginal effect
is positive and highly significant (with a probability value of 0.004). Likewise, for the maxi-
mum export costs, the impact is significantly negative (with a probability value of 0.004). This
seemingly paradoxical result may be driven by the constrained optimization of trade authorities.
When an economy is closed, relatively little funding may be available to the officials regulating
exports. Therefore they would have an incentive to focus their efforts in locations where the
values of production, productivity and exports are particularly high, i.e. SEZs.35 This greater
scrutiny within an SEZ may then increase the probability of inspection, increasing the expected
need for the appropriate export permits which, particularly in these countries, are costly. As
such, while some aspects of exporting may be reduced by the SEZ, the fixed cost of doing so
may rise. In more open and better funded countries, however, this effect would be smaller as
the trade authority casts a wider inspection net, allowing the export promoting aspects of SEZs
to dominate. Furthermore, these effects are economically large. Approximately 40% of firms in
low export cost countries export. As such, the nearly 0.1 increase for low export cost countries
in Figure 1 is a 25% increase in the probability of exporting. At the other end, in high export
cost countries, only about 20% of firms export. Therefore the roughly 0.2 reduction would
reduce the probability of exporting by nearly 100%.
In columns (4), (5), and (6), we repeat this exercise, replacing the export cost interaction
with an interaction using the tax, regulation, and institution indices. In each case, neither the
SEZ variable nor its interaction is significant. In column (7), we utilize the NTB interaction
and find a negative coefficient on this interaction. At the sample mean (where the NTB value is
34 Although the surveys contain some firm-level information on exporting, as this is available reported
only by exporters, we cannot make use of these data as they are missing for non-exporting firms.
35 A comparable effect is found by Go´mez-Guillamo´n and Sanchez-Val (2012) who find that tax auditing
is more effective in more dense areas.
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Figure 1: Change in the Probability of Exporting - Export Costs
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Figure 2: Change in the Probability of Exporting - NTBs
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-5.991), the net effect of an SEZ is −1.979 + (−0.326) ∗ (−5.991) = −0.026, which as indicated
at the bottom of the table we cannot reject as different from zero. However, as with the export
cost, this masks variation across countries that is revealed when plotting the difference in export
probabilities across the different NTB levels in Figure 2. The figure shows that whenever NTB
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level is low (i.e. upper left corner) the higher the probability that firms in SEZs would export
as oppose to firms in non-SEZ areas. For countries with minimal NTBs, as with the export cost
measure, the net effect is positive and significant. For high NTB countries, the impact is negative
and significant with the effect in very high NTB countries estimated to equate to roughly a 50%
reduction in the probability of exporting. Thus, again we see that closed economies are those
where NTBs seem to lower the probability of exporting. Finally, column (8) includes all five
interactions where only the export cost and institution coefficients are significant. Here, we find
that SEZs increase the export probability in countries with weak institutions. In addition, we
again find that they reduce the export probability in countries with high export costs. Finally,
as in column (3), we find a significantly positive net effect for low export cost countries (with a
probability value of 0.001) and a significantly negative effect for high export cost nations (with
a probability value of 0.0007).
4.2 Propensity Score Matching: Probability of Exporting
Table 6 displays the results of propensity score matching. In Panel A of the table results with the
unmatched sample indicates that SEZ firms are significantly more likely to export (as in Table
4). However, after matching, i.e. ensuring that probability of treatment is controlled for, the
difference between SEZ and non-SEZ firms is insignificantly negative with a value of τATT =
−0.0159. This is in line with the results of Steenbergen and Javorcik (2017) but in contradiction
to the matching results from Nazarczuk and Uminski (2018) who report τATT = 0.184 which
is statistically significant at 1% level. Beyond the obvious differences in data sets, it should
be noted that export barriers in Rwanda are likely large in comparison to the countries in our
sample whereas Polish barriers are likely relatively low. Coming back to our result, the negative
differences in the probability of exporting are driven not by a firm being in an SEZ, but by the
characteristics of firms in SEZs. In order to support the validity of this test, Panel B presents
three post-estimation checks, discussed in Caliendo and Koeinig (2008). The first of these is
a two-sample t-test, which works by comparing the means of the covariates between the SEZ
and non-SEZ firms, before and after matching. If the matching is of a high quality (i.e. the
distribution of treated and control groups are quite similar), no significant differences should be
found after matching. As the table indicates, it is indeed the case. The second test involves re-
estimating the propensity score using the matched sample and comparing the Pseudo R-squared
obtained from the probit estimation before and after matching. Again, if the matching is of a
high quality, the distribution of the covariates should be similar across treated and untreated
firms, resulting in a relatively low pseudo-R2 after matching has taken place. Again, this holds.
Finally, we perform a likelihood test on the joint significance of all the variables included in the
probit model before and after matching. Following the same logic, we should expect to reject
this test on the matched sample only (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008) which is again the case.
Thus, these tests support the validity of the matching.
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Combining these results, we see that the impact of SEZs on the probability of exporting is
a nuanced one. In open economies, particularly those generally open to exports, SEZs seem to
increase exporting at the extensive margin. For those that are closed to exports and/or imports,
however, the opposite effect is found. This is consistent with Johansson and Nilsson (1997)
and may be reflective of differences between open and closed economies with respect to the
effectiveness of trade authorities.
Table 6: Propensity Score Matching: Probability of Exporting
Panel A: Selection
Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
Unmatched 0.207978311 0.193411765 0.014566 0.00830 1.75
ATT 0.2 0.215879017 -0.015879 0.01457 -1.09
Panel B: Sensitivity Test
Variable Matched Treated Control T stat Prob. Val.
Productivity Unmatched 10.151 9.5113 22.3 0.000
Matched 10.058 10.063 -0.15 0.884
Employment Unmatched 3.9051 3.6355 9.92 0.000
Matched 3.7916 3.8166 -0.7 0.483
Age Unmatched 2.7018 2.7577 -3.47 0.001
Matched 2.7471 2.7555 -0.4 0.691
Foreign Owned Unmatched 0.03428 0.03576 -0.39 0.695
Matched 0.02987 0.02949 0.08 0.935
Quality Cert. Unmatched 0.52401 0.25765 27.22 0.000
Matched 0.46578 0.46994 -0.3 0.762
Multi-product Unmatched 0.26569 0.39294 -13.26 0.000
Matched 0.27713 0.29452 -1.4 0.162
License Unmatched 0.13865 0.09106 7.16 0.000
Matched 0.10851 0.09981 1.04 0.301
Import Unmatched 0.12393 0.14024 -2.33 0.020
Matched 0.11682 0.1293 -1.38 0.167
Sample Pseudo R2 LR χ2 p > χ2
Raw 0.229 2966.48 0
Matched 0.005 34.08 0.833
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4.3 Regression Estimates: The Intensive Margin of Trade
The above results indicate that SEZs have an impact on the extensive margin of trade; however
in closed economies, this effect is negative suggesting that SEZs there may increase inspections
and the fixed cost of exporting. This does not, however, mean that they must also reduce trade
for firms that choose to export since they may simultaneously work to lower the marginal cost
of exporting. In this section, we use two measures of the intensive margin, the logged share
of sales generated via exports (export intensity) and the logged value of exports (export value).
Note that in this analysis, we restrict ourselves to the set of exporting firms and thus face no
problems with zero exports.
4.3.1 Regression Estimates and Matching: Export Intensity
Table 7 begins by estimating the effect of SEZs and the other controls on the export intensity
using the same approach as in Table 5. Because the export intensity cannot exceed zero (the log
of 1), we use a Tobit estimator. As can be seen, SEZs have limited effects. In column (7), we
find a marginally significant coefficient both for the SEZ variable and the interaction. Figure
3 plots the estimated difference between an SEZ firm’s export intensity a comparable non-SEZ
firm across the different NTB levels. The figure indicates that when the NTB level is high in a
country (upper right corner) the higher the relative export intensity of an SEZ firm (note that in
this and subsequent figures, confidence intervals are included but that they are difficult to see
due to the preciseness of the estimates). For open economies (left-hand side of the graph), the
point estimate of this difference is negative but economically small. For high NTB countries,
however, the effect is significantly positive (with a probability value of 0.049 at the maximum
NTB). However, when we also control for export costs in column (8), this effect disappears
to be replaced by a marginally negative coefficient on the interaction between SEZ status and
trade costs. This results in a pattern similar to Figure 1; however it is only for high export cost
countries that we find a significant net effect. That said, as the significance of the coefficients is
not particularly strong, we do not wish to make too much of these results, preferring to instead
say that the evidence of an SEZ effect on export intensity is at best limited. Other controls do,
however, have a strong impact on the export intensity. In particular, younger, single-product,
non-importers earn a greater share of sales from exporting.
As with the extensive margin, one might worry about the endogeneity of the SEZ variable,
thus in Table 8 we employ the same matching technique described above (but replacing the
exporter dummy with the export intensity variable). Here, as we have fewer exporting firms
we are forced to rely on a set of 821 non-SEZ firms and 158 SEZ firms for which we had
common support. As in the extensive margin results, after matching we estimate an insignificant
τATT = 0.1433 with the post-estimation tests supporting the quality of the matches. That is in
line with Nazarczuk and Uminski (2018). Thus, after other important firm characteristics are
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Table 7: Export Intensity
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Productivity -0.0349 -0.0368 -0.0364 -0.0369 -0.0377* -0.0369 -0.0392* -0.0396*
(0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0227)
Employment 0.0311 0.0314 0.0314 0.0314 0.0322 0.0312 0.0322 0.0342
(0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0249) (0.0250) (0.0249) (0.0249)
Age -0.166*** -0.161*** -0.160*** -0.161*** -0.163*** -0.162*** -0.163*** -0.161***
(0.0383) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0383) (0.0382)
Foreign Owned 0.0858 0.0819 0.0811 0.0836 0.0659 0.0795 0.0748 0.0622
(0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.116) (0.117) (0.116) (0.118)
Quality Cert. -0.0883 -0.0943 -0.0947 -0.0944 -0.0961 -0.0946 -0.0959 -0.102
(0.0674) (0.0675) (0.0675) (0.0675) (0.0673) (0.0674) (0.0673) (0.0674)
Multi-product -0.216*** -0.212*** -0.212*** -0.213*** -0.211*** -0.212*** -0.213*** -0.209***
(0.0639) (0.0637) (0.0638) (0.0637) (0.0637) (0.0637) (0.0637) (0.0641)
License 0.0769 0.0736 0.0728 0.0733 0.0772 0.0737 0.0768 0.0760
(0.0780) (0.0779) (0.0779) (0.0780) (0.0781) (0.0779) (0.0780) (0.0779)
Import -0.121* -0.123* -0.122* -0.122* -0.127* -0.124* -0.128* -0.124*
(0.0669) (0.0667) (0.0668) (0.0668) (0.0666) (0.0667) (0.0666) (0.0664)
SEZ 0.0940 0.0904 0.00687 1.026 0.226 1.454* 2.895*
(0.0730) (0.0728) (0.477) (0.652) (0.497) (0.782) (1.515)
Export costs*SEZ -0.0339 -0.224*
(0.0691) (0.131)
Taxes*SEZ -0.0214 -0.0765
(0.117) (0.373)
Regulation*SEZ 0.165 0.134
(0.114) (0.360)
Institutions*SEZ 0.0240 -0.0615
(0.0884) (0.155)
NTBs*SEZ 0.222* 0.445
(0.126) (0.317)
Constant -0.822** -0.852** -0.821** -0.811** -1.006** -0.911** -0.764** -0.295
(0.363) (0.367) (0.365) (0.390) (0.391) (0.413) (0.365) (0.420)
Net SEZ effect=0 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.19 0.11 0.23
Observations 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291
Notes: ***, **, and * on difference denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All specifications include
country, sector, and year dummies. Net SEZ Effect = 0 reports the p value at the sample mean.
matched, the export intensity of SEZ and non-SEZ firms are statistically the same.
4.3.2 Regression Estimates and Matching: Export Value
Table 9 turns to the Export Value (again for the set of exporting firms). As with the export
intensity results, we find limited impact of SEZs. That said, we do find a relatively robust
impact from the NTB interaction which is significantly positive, both on its own in column (7)
and when used alongside the other interactions in column (8). Figure 4 illustrates the estimated
impact. The figure indicates that whenever NTB level is high (i.e. closed economies) the
higher the difference in export sales level between firms in SEZs,and those in non-SEZ parts
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Figure 3: Change in Intensity of Exporting - NTBs
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Note: 95% Confidence Intervals are extremely narrow and hence indis-
tringuishable from the line.
(upper right corner). Comparable to Figure 3, we find no economically significant effect for
low NTB countries but an economically and statistically significant positive effect in high NTB
countries. At that end of the NTB distribution, the expected difference in exports is 0.5 which,
relative to the mean export value of 13.7 in high NTB countries, is a 3.6% increase. This
may be evidence of the fact that it is possible for SEZ firms to import intermediates under
reduced duties, increasing production and therefore exports. In addition, column (5) provides
some marginal evidence that SEZ increase export volumes in strong regulation countries, with
the effect illustrated in Figure 5. The figure suggests that at highly regulated economies the
difference in export volumes become more apparent between firms in SEZs and those in non-
SEZ parts where SEZ firms making more export sales. Again, it is only for the heavily regulated
countries where we estimate an economically significant net effect, one which indicates that
SEZ firms in these nations export a greater value. Beyond the SEZ variable, unsurprisingly,
more productive, larger, and foreign firms export higher values. Younger, single-product, and
non-importing firms also export greater values.
Finally, Table 10 again explores the possibility that our results are driven by endogeneity
of the SEZ variable. Nevertheless, we again find an insignificant effect after matching, with
τATT = 0.0212. As with the extensive margin, this is consistent with export value results of
Steenbergen and Javorcik (2017) but differs from those Nazarczuk and Uminski (2018). Note
165
Review of Economic Analysis 11 (2019) 145–174
that, as this is the same set of firms as in Table 8 with a different export outcome variable, the
post-estimation tests from matching are the same as reported there.
Table 8: Propensity Score Matching: Export Intensity
Panel A: Selection
Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
Unmatched -1.17866516 -0.823489372 -0.355175786 0.052534604 -6.76
ATT -1.14432697 -1.28757787 0.143250898 0.141142051 1.01
Panel B: Sensitivity Test
Variable Treated Control T stat Prob. Val.
Productivity Unmatched 10.46 9.7555 10.68 0.000
Matched 10.357 10.496 -0.89 0.375
Employment Unmatched 4.7738 4.9919 -3.41 0.001
Matched 4.884 4.6757 1.40 0.164
Age Unmatched 2.8231 2.9316 -3.04 0.002
Matched 2.8858 2.9854 -1.20 0.232
Foreign Owned Unmatched .10056 .07186 2.19 0.029
Matched .10759 .06329 1.41 0.160
Quality Cert. Unmatched .69646 .4933 9.17 0.000
Matched .72152 .64557 1.45 0.148
Multi-product Unmatched .26536 .42144 -7.24 0.000
Matched .25949 .24684 0.26 0.797
License Unmatched .19646 .19732 -0.05 0.963
Matched .23418 .20886 0.54 0.589
Import Unmatched .3473 .36784 -0.93 0.355
Matched .3481 .33544 0.24 0.813
Sample Pseudo R2 LR χ2 p > χ2
Raw 0.232 601.61 0
Matched 0.092 39.18 0.179
4.4 Comparing SEZ Impact Estimates with Other Studies
Combining these results, we find that, while there is limited evidence of SEZs affecting the
export share or the number of exporters, however, they do seem to encourage greater value of
exports in countries with high NTBs/export costs, potentially due to reduced duties on imported
intermediates. As we find no robust effect on the export intensity, this would suggest that
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Table 9: Value of Exports
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Productivity 0.967*** 0.966*** 0.966*** 0.966*** 0.966*** 0.966*** 0.964*** 0.964***
(0.0167) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0169)
Employment 1.011*** 1.011*** 1.011*** 1.011*** 1.011*** 1.011*** 1.011*** 1.013***
(0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184)
Age -0.0852*** -0.0808*** -0.0808*** -0.0807*** -0.0820*** -0.0811*** -0.0825*** -0.0806***
(0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0284) (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0283)
Foreign Owned 0.0716 0.0668 0.0667 0.0676 0.0530 0.0649 0.0581 0.0543
(0.0873) (0.0874) (0.0874) (0.0881) (0.0877) (0.0880) (0.0875) (0.0885)
Quality Cert. -0.0304 -0.0351 -0.0351 -0.0351 -0.0368 -0.0352 -0.0368 -0.0391
(0.0482) (0.0482) (0.0482) (0.0482) (0.0481) (0.0482) (0.0481) (0.0481)
Multi-product -0.134*** -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.129*** -0.131*** -0.130*** -0.128***
(0.0465) (0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0466)
License 0.0493 0.0464 0.0463 0.0462 0.0478 0.0463 0.0476 0.0466
(0.0549) (0.0549) (0.0549) (0.0549) (0.0549) (0.0549) (0.0548) (0.0547)
Import -0.110** -0.112** -0.112** -0.112** -0.115** -0.113** -0.116** -0.112**
(0.0496) (0.0496) (0.0496) (0.0496) (0.0496) (0.0495) (0.0495) (0.0495)
SEZ 0.0765 0.0760 0.0364 0.790* 0.167 1.189** 1.898**
(0.0545) (0.0543) (0.381) (0.409) (0.349) (0.506) (0.963)
Export costs*SEZ -0.00411 -0.130
(0.0550) (0.0887)
Taxes*SEZ -0.00989 -0.0236
(0.0948) (0.239)
Regulation*SEZ 0.128* 0.0412
(0.0744) (0.222)
Institutions*SEZ 0.0167 -0.0962
(0.0643) (0.117)
NTBs*SEZ 0.183** 0.367*
(0.0842) (0.217)
Constant -0.642** -0.705** -1.137*** -0.695** -0.773*** -0.734** -0.938*** -0.362
(0.276) (0.276) (0.382) (0.290) (0.278) (0.298) (0.295) (0.573)
Net SEZ effect=0 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.9 0.26
Observations 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291 2,291
R-squared 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.839
Notes: ***, **, and * on difference denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All specifications include country, sector
and year dummies. Net SEZ Effect = 0 reports the p value at the sample mean.
Table 10: Propensity Score Matching: Export Value
Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
Unmatched 14.0554632 13.9238786 0.131584618 0.099936301 1.32
ATT 14.0969394 13.884578 0.212361387 0.260619058 0.81
cheaper imports increase both exports and domestic sales proportionally. Further, this is an
economically sizable effect. In the high NTB countries, the mean (log) value of sales is 11.8.
Pulling the estimated increase of 0.35 from 4 for these countries, this means an increase in
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Figure 4: Change in Value of Exports - NTBs
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(non-logged) sales of 41.9%.
Because the interaction with these trade barrier measures is our innovation, there are no
comparable results in the literature for us to compare ourselves to. Nevertheless, it is instruc-
tive to compare what is comparable (the non-interacted SEZ dummy in column 2 of Tables 5
(probability of exporting) and 9 (export value)). In Table 11, we compare our estimates with
those in Nazarczuk and Uminski (2018), Steenbergen and Javorcik (2017), and Nesterenko
(2003). While there are differences across the studies, all, use firm-level data, employ and ex-
porter dummy (using a Logit estimator) or logged export values (with OLS), and include an
SEZ dummy as the variable of interest. However, there are differences in terms of time, country
coverage and the size of samples as shown in the table. Despite these difference, as reported,
the various studies all find positive coefficents for the SEZ dummy at both level extensive and
intensive margins. Overall, the magnitude of our estimates fall somewhere in the middle with
those reported by Nazarczuk and Uminski (2018) notably higher which might be due to the
overall openness of Poland compared to the countries in the other three studies. In general, we
find that our estimates are generally in line with those found elsewhere which suggests that,
across the literature while SEZs do not negatively impact firms’ exporting behavior, their value
as an export-promoting policy tool can be questioned.
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Figure 5: Change in Value of Exports - Regulation
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Table 11: Extensive and Intensive Margin Estimates Compared
Nazarczuk Steenbergena Nesterenkob (2003) Ourc
& Uminski (2018) & Javorcik (2017) Results
Dep. Var. — Exporter (dummy) Exporter (dummy) Exporter (dummy) Exporter (dummy)
SEZ — 1.124 0.0079 0.48311*** 0.0115
Dep. Var. — Export Value (log) Export Value (log) Export Value (log) Export Value (log)
SEZ — 1.740*** 0.159 0.067*** 0.0765
Data — Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level Firm-level
Obs. — 518 179,149 23,649 11,161/ 2,291
Period(s) — 2004-2014 2008-2016 1996-1999 2007-2014
Sector(s) — Mnfc. Mnfc & Srvs Mnfc. 22 Mnfc.
Country(ies) — Poland Rwanda Ukraine 21 African/Asian
Est. method — Logit/OLS-FE Logit/OLS-FE-DiD Logit/OLS-FE Logit/OLS-FE
Notes: ***, **, and * on difference denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
a They use quarterly firm reports in and outside of SEZs in Kigali, Rwanda.
b Dataset covers 24 counties in Ukraine.
c Our dataset is a cross-sectional one consolidating surveys conducted at some point in 2007-14 period.
4.5 Additional Regressions
To explore the data further, we examined several alternative samples. First, rather than man-
ufacturing, we considered agricultural products. There, as in manufacturing, we found only
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occasionally significant impacts of SEZs and when this was the case, they were typically neg-
ative and then for the extensive margin. Second, we considered different subsamples of manu-
facturing, specifically food, transport equipment, and textiles. Although the significance of the
coefficients was markedly weaker, potentially due to the smaller sample sizes, when the SEZ
variables were significant, they were comparable to those found here. As a further test of the
endogeneity of the SEZ variable, following the results of Ebenstein (2012), we split the sample
between foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms since he found that the first group was
more likely to locate in an SEZ than elsewhere. Nevertheless, we found the same results in
these subsamples as in the combined sample, again suggesting that endogeneity is not driving
the result. We estimated the effect of SEZs separately for Asian and African countries (the
two groups in our data) and excluding India (which represents a large share of the sample). In
both cases, neither the SEZ variable itself nor its interactions were significant. We also tried to
interact importer dummy with the NTB and export cost variables.36 When doing so, we find
that importers in SEZs have a smaller impact from NTBs on their exporting behavior at both
margins, suggestive that SEZs might help to mitigate some of the trade barriers felt by importers
who also wish to export. Finally, in our intensive margin regressions, we explored the potential
role of the WTO’s Export Share Requirement (ERS) policy.37. This policy demands that, to
be consistent with WTO rules, firms in SEZs should be required to achieve a minimum export
intensity (Defever and Riano, 2017). In Table 4, we show that the export share of SEZ firms is
instead smaller than for non-SEZ ones, suggesting a contradiction of the ERS policy. Delving
deeper, this difference is driven by two countries, Zimbabwe and South Africa.38 That said, af-
ter dropping these two countries, our results do not change significantly. All of these additional
results are available on request.
5 Conclusion
Special economic zones have long been touted as a method of increasing exports and, as a result,
improving the level of development in a region. While there are numerous case studies on the
issue, there is scant econometric evidence testing the notion. We contribute to the debate by
providing the first firm-level, cross-country econometric study testing whether SEZs do in fact
increase exports at either the extensive or intensive margins. The resulting pattern is a nuanced
one. At the extensive margin, SEZs increase the likelihood of exporting by as much as 25%, but
only for firms in relatively open economies. In closed economies, we find the opposite effect,
36 This was motivated in part by Yang, et al. (2011) who find that firms choose to move to SEZs in China
because they import raw materials and intermediates. Thus, the import duty reductions in the SEZ
significantly lower importers’ production costs.
37 We thank one of our reviewers for suggesting this.
38 Those countries might have removed the ERS policy to attract more FDI to their SEZs as done by the
Dominican Republic (Defever, et al. 2017).
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something that might be consistent with differing patterns of enforcement across countries.
At the intensive margin, we find little evidence suggesting that SEZs affect the share of sales
earned from exporting. They do, however, seem to markedly increase the value of exports
in countries with import barriers, something that suggests that SEZs may reduce the cost of
intermediate inputs, encouraging both domestic and foreign sales. Combining these effects,
if the goal is to increase exporting, it is likely that policy makers will need to consider SEZs
in light of the local economic environment before choosing to use them. This is consistent
with the other single-country studies on SEZs and, as indicated in Yang, et al. (2011), it may
suggest that the additional costs of being in an SEZ (e.g. higher fixed setup costs) can outweigh
their benefits. That said, our results do indicate a conditional effectiveness of SEZs and future
research with access to panel data can help to fill out the policy environment for which they
do (or do not) promote exporting. In particular, our estimates suggest that in open economies,
SEZs affect the extensive margin positively with little effect on the intensive margin whereas
for closed economies, introducing SEZs may mean greater exports spread across fewer firms.
As these have distributional consequences across firms and regions, such factors should be
considered when creating SEZs. As such, we hope that our results provide a stepping stone to
the development of a framework under which SEZs play a useful role in a general overhaul of
a country’s policies.
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6 Appendix
Table 12: Countries in the Sample
Country N N* Year
Angola 111 22 2010
Bangladesh 1138 172 2013
Botswana 88 49 2010
Burkina Faso 61 28 2009
Cameroon 65 18 2009
Chad 57 16 2009
Ethiopia 177 61 2011
India 6834 4523 2014
Lesotho 43 27 2009
Madagascar 116 30 2009
Mali 283 283 2007
Mauritius 126 29 2009
Mozambique 253 253 2007
Nepal 243 162 2013
Nigeria 45 15 2009
South Africa 506 506 2007
Sri Lanka 310 12 2011
Tanzania 229 2013
Togo 13 2009
Uganda 233 2013
Zambia 243 243 2007
Total 11161 6449
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